odd links

I just noticed that the banner above my blog always reads: related searches and that those searches always vary but today this included a "pro-death penalty" link which disturbs me. I am not for the death penalty and I haven't advocated that anywhere on this blog so I am wondering why that was chosen (obviously arbitrarily) as a possible "related search."

On a different note, this blog has taken a bit of a side seat to my applying for the undergrad research grant (or at least rewriting my proposal for it, as I haven't actually applied yet) and to summer school, work and life in general. Last week alone, I took my first political soc exam, read three books (in their entirety), worked and studied. This seems to be the tempo for the next six months as I will have only a weekend off between the summer and fall semesters. I am really happy though about the amount of fascinating work that comes from reading so many conflicting views on human rights advocacy, activism and academia. I differentiate between these primarily because not every person who advocates for human rights likes to be labeled an "activist." One of the books I finished last week was the "Opposing Viewpoints: Human Rights" and I recommend it highly but must add that it needs to read very critically. One thing that fascinated me about it is how so many of the essayists featured in opposition to one another had credentials that matched their stereotypical "liberal" or "conservative" policies. I'm including here an excerpt of my response paper for this book to show the depth of their arguments and my analysis as well. I'm off to finish my soc reading now. Peace!

Many of those arguing against the idea of or support for universal human rights, were either "experts" belonging to those entities cited
as human rights violators, such as Fred Smith who wrote "Consumer Boycotts are a Misguided Response to Sweatshops" and who just happens to be the founder of the "Competitive Enterprise Institute, which provides market-based solutions to public policy problems" (133). One should also consider the background of Charles Jacobs who is actually arguing for the eradication of African slavery but who focuses on only that slavery condoned/committed by Arabs and those enslaved who "are forcibly converted to Islam" (112). Jacobs just happens to champion the cause of "Christian Solidarity International" that attempts to buy these back slaves from slaveholders and reunite them with their families and he is the president of an NGO called "The American Anti-Slavery Group," and Jacobs, according to the essay by David Hoile, "...has been accused of "Muslim baiting" and has referred to the Prophet Muhammed as a swindler" (121).

While their credentials alone do not discredit their arguments outright, I still find the "strength" and passion of their arguments fascinating when put in the context of their professional and personal connections. Another (my favorite, actually) example, is that of John Gentry (who wrote an article titled "The Cancer of Human Rights" and the editors list as "a former CIA analyst who researches and writes on defense and national security" (49). The title of his essay? "Defining Human Rights Too Broadly Can Destroy Nations." His argument? Chiefly, that "excessive human rights" lead Americans to believe they are
simply entitled to their rights (which he terms the entitlement ethic) and yet not willing to exercise "personal responsibility" for such rights. It is most ironic that Gentry's argument actually echoes parts of an essay by Blair Gibb (titled "Human Rights are not necessarily
universal") in which Gibb is critical not of the attempt to ensure every human being has certain safeguarded rights, but that the US model is highly problematic in its hyper pro-individualism and prioritization of civil and political expressive "freedoms" over the advocacy of socio-economic and environmentally conscientious policies that promote
social cohesion and personal responsibility.(29-30)

Though both men are arguing against notions of universality, their reasons for doing so are entirely different (Gentry does so because he feels "excessive human rights" weakens nations and Gibb views such universality as yet another dangerous Western (meaning here, American) export meant to subvert any attempts at "Third World" nations
to be socialist rather than capitalist). This is why critical thinking is key to even engaging these arguments. It would be easy and convienent to dismiss the "other side" of my preferred beliefs without even engaging their arguments and especially after having read
them. Still, to do so blanketly, would be a detriment as each "opposing viewpoint" in the book does offer very valid points for consideration.

One of the most powerful and provocative debates the book covers is that of defining and enforcing human rights in the face of what Jack Donnelly terms "moral relativism and universalism." Donnelly advocates (in his essay titled "Human Rights are Universal") what he terms a "weak relativism" that reverses the emphasis of culture as a
determinant of human rights enforcement. He recommends that the concept of human rights be placed in highest regard with "justifiable modifications" as rare deviations of the "human rights norms" (23).
Blair Gibb stands in opposition to this (as previously mentioned) chiefly because he, like many in the "Third World" and non-socialist countries, view this universality as a dangerous neo-cultural imperalism. Donnelly also recognizes this, as he argues against this notion, explaining "Even if we are not entitled to impose our values on others, they are our own values. Sometimes they may demand that we act on them even in the abscence of agreement by others" (25). Here, Donnelly's argument falls apart to the critique (of an essay not even in the same section of the book) of NGO's by Robert Hayden who sees them as having been "co-opted" by the state into a direct opposition of their intended purpose (often due to financial reasons) for having "become proponents of the massive application of force by stronger states against weaker ones, since that is what "humanitarian intervention" means, at least when coupled with the realist limitation that it should be done "where we can do it," meaning without suffering losses or risking retaliation" (149). Hayden's sharp (although at times, hypercritical) analysis of the action taken on behalf of defending such universality (which he argues, varies according to the desire of the State and the dollar) critically challenges the effectiveness of Donnelly's assumptions, as does Gibbs's. The problem though is how do we find a crossroad or interference point where everyone can be happy, or at the very least, everyone can be protected (as the UDHR attempts to ensure)?

I find the tendency to lapse into "liberal bashing" the most difficult aspect of this book. Most of the essays that can be catagorized as "against" some aspect, document or declaration of universal human rights, do slip into the nasty habit of sizing up the proponents of such rights as idealistic idiots who have no real concept of the effects of their liberal fantasies or moral advocacy. Notably, those arguing "for" universalization typically do not, when space or time permits a lag in argument, sink into such muckraking. I was most impressed and relieved by those few essayists who did argue against universality and still managed to refrain from lumping every activist and advocate in the "damned stupid liberals" catagory. Hayden, Gibb and even Richard D. Lamm ("Health care is not a human right") were the few, the proud, and the brilliant who managed to refrain from gross and rampant liberal bashing and this, I think, made the strength of their sentiments even more powerful, even if I don't agree with them.